

JUN 14 1979

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, DC 20408

PLY TO
ATTN OF: N

SUBJECT: Staff guidance on declassification of
Central Intelligence Agency originated
information 20 years old or older.

TO: NC, NL, NN

1. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by letter of June 5, 1979 (Stansfield Turner to James B. Rhoads) transmitted "Central Intelligence Agency Systematic Review Guidelines." The guidelines are attached.
2. The declassification stamp marking to be applied to such information as may be declassified pursuant to these guidelines should appear as follows:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
CIA guidelines, June 5, 1979
By _____ NARS, Date _____

3. NARS general and specific restrictions will continue to be applied to the accessioned records of the CIA and predecessor agencies (Coordinator of Information (COI), July 1941-June 1942; Office of Strategic Services (OSS), June 1942-September 1945; Strategic Services Unit (SSU), October 1945-October 1946; and Central Intelligence Group (CIG), October 1946-47) as in the past. The donor restrictions imposed on donated historical materials will be applied prior to release.

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4. Until further notice the following guidance remain in effect:

STATSPEC

- a. NND Staff Information Memo - "Declassification of records originated by the [REDACTED]," dated March 23, 1976.

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- b. NND Staff Information Memo - "Review for declassification of [REDACTED] and Foreign Documents Division originated information, 1946-50," dated October 6, 1977. Change the authority line of the declassification stamp to read "E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402."

- c. NND Staff Information Supplement No. 1 to above memo, dated October 26, 1978.

- d. NND Staff Information Memo - OSS #2, "Declassification review of the serially-numbered reports issued by the Research and Analysis Branch of the Coordinator of Information/Office of Strategic Services," dated April 23, 1974.

- e. NND Staff Information Memo - Intelligence No. 2. "Final declassification authority for certain high level intelligence documents, 1946-48," dated January 16, 1976.




Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

f. NN's memorandum, subject "Intelligence method - secret writing," dated June 21, 1973.

g. N's memorandum, subject "Downgrading of World War II Top Secret records in NARS," dated June 21, 1973.

h. NND Staff Information Memo - CIA #1. "Systematic review for declassification of unevaluated SO, SODB, DB, OO and other field intelligence reports dated after December 31, 1945," dated December 12, 1978.

5. Any questions concerning this matter should be referred to NND (523-3165).


JAMES E. O'NEILL
Acting Archivist
of the United States

Attachment

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GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING AND HANDLING CIA INFORMATION
DURING DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF RECORDS FROM THE PERIOD 1946-54

INTRODUCTION

This guideline will serve as the basis for identifying and handling information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by the CIA or one of its predecessor organizations, or is information from that period which falls under CIA jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify information. Its purpose is to provide background and general descriptions intended to aid declassification review personnel to identify CIA material that may be found in the records of other agencies. When such material is found it must be reviewed for declassification by CIA personnel. This is necessary because an intelligence agency has special security problems. All components of an intelligence agency are either directly involved in clandestine work, provide support to elements that are engaged in clandestine work, or are involved in processing clandestinely acquired information into a finished intelligence product. Whatever their role, there is an interrelationship among these elements which makes them all sensitive to one degree or another and an exposure in one can lead to an exposure in another. It requires a thorough understanding of these components and their interrelationships to assess the degree of sensitivity of information relating to intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U)

The inherent sensitivity of intelligence organizations is attested to by the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence organization to make its records public except after a minimum of 30 years and then sources and methods are still completely protected. This point is important from another aspect: the intelligence services of nations friendly to the U.S. are keenly aware of the situation created by the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, mandatory review, and systematic declassification review, and are very sensitive to the possibility that information that they pass to the U.S. government may be exposed. For this reason, we do not declassify or even downgrade information from other intelligence services without their concurrence. (C)

BACKGROUND

During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a transitional period. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which played the major U.S. intelligence role during WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945. It was succeeded by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) which existed for one year. The records of the OSS and the SSU reflect a wartime context, being staffed with military personnel and putting emphasis on "hot war" activities related to the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more civilians while it succeeded in absorbing the SSU by the end of October 1946. The CIG in turn was replaced by the CIA on 18 September 1947. The CIA was created as a civilian organization and remains one today. (U)

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The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime, then very quickly into a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities in Korea, 1950-54. Intelligence activities during the period 1946-54 were not of wartime nature but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast. Considerable resources were devoted to special activities aimed at strengthening the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action operations. Measures were undertaken to prepare for a "hot war" situation. Refugee and especially defector debriefings were an important source of intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations were not ignored. Throughout this period the "iron curtain" between the West and East proved very difficult for our relatively young intelligence agencies to penetrate, and it restricted the flow of even overt information to the West. That forced collection efforts into many unlikely areas which normally would be considered overt. (U)

During this period, CIA and the other U.S. national security agencies were learning to coordinate their intelligence activities and were developing channels among themselves and with other U.S. government agencies to get administrative and operational support. Because intelligence agencies must establish themselves and operate abroad under some legitimate form, i.e. cover, they require a broad spectrum of support from agencies that function overtly. The latter will provide transportation, housing, offices, equipment, medical facilities, etc., the provision of which must be done covertly to provide cover for intelligence personnel. The arrangements for and actual providing of this support will leave a "paper trail" some of which will be classified, and some of which will not. This "paper trail" may be found among any type of administrative or operational records of the agencies and units which are involved in providing the cover. Many of these records may appear routine and normal for the unit. If all is done properly, it may be difficult from administrative records to identify the intelligence connection. But care must be exercised when reviewing all the unit's records that no document is declassified which could compromise the intelligence connection, even inferentially, and thus "blow" the cover. (See also the CIA Guideline to Aid NARS Identify Unclassified Information Concerning Intelligence Sources and Methods). (C)

The identification of intelligence related documents and information can be very difficult, and one purpose of this guideline is to assist the records reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U)

GENERAL GUIDELINE

For the purpose of identifying information relating to CIA we may break down its activities into four major areas: Plans and Policies; Collection; Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a brief general description of each of these areas intended to serve as a framework within which to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U)

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
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Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence community comes from the National Security Council (NSC). Many intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are initiated by the NSC or by presidential commissions such as the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) or the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and eventually adopting and formulating such guidance and the record of such collective activities may be held by all the participating agencies. The implementation of such plans must be coordinated at all levels and with the many types of units. This broad involvement will be documented and that record will be found somewhere in the files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning papers often do not indicate the source of the specific information used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and it is not possible to identify the specific agency or department responsible for the information, CIA would like to have the opportunity to review that material. Classified planning and policy records relating to intelligence activities normally will require protection for long periods of time because (1) they officially confirm U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible denial and, (2) might provide details which could compromise intelligence sources and methods. (C)

Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by all methods both human and technical. This involves the development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can obtain the intelligence information that our government needs. The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to preserve the flow of intelligence information, to prevent disruption in our foreign relations, to protect those persons and organizations who risk themselves on our behalf, to protect our national investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent the targetted persons and countries from becoming aware of our intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take actions to nullify the results obtained or take aggressive countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U)

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being about the degree of success of the system and data which, if divulged, would aid in the development of countermeasures to negate collection. (U)

Much of the processing of technical data (such as in the field of overhead photography) is a joint effort by CIA and other U.S. government agencies, particularly elements of the Department of Defense. The research and development of advanced methods of technical collection is often a joint effort, with CIA sharing contracting, appropriations, testing, etc. with other agencies. Consequently, many documents concerning such joint efforts will be found in the files of all participating agencies. The review of classified documents arising from such joint activities must be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)

Analysis is generally known and understood as the collation and processing of raw data from many different sources to find the solution to some question confronting our policy makers. There are many specific techniques that will be classified. The weighing and establishing of priorities for collection data and its use in estimating foreign capabilities and intentions is an intellectual process used by all analysts. But the fact that the Agency employs unique intelligence methodologies, for example, to estimate the costs of foreign defense activities, is classified. So are analytical techniques used in assessing the impact of natural resources, science and technology development, and food and population factors on foreign military, political, and economic responses to the U.S. The substantive intelligence produced by such analysis is often unavailable any other way. (C)

1 (U)

As in the case of processing, CIA has often shared analysis duties with other government agencies, with many of the private "think tanks," and with analytical institutions sponsored by various American universities. CIA often has shared in contracts other U.S. government agencies have had with such institutions. Once again, this will result in documents of interest to CIA being found in many files within and outside the intelligence community, and review of these classified records from joint activities must be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)

Production and Dissemination - The basic informational end product of an intelligence service is the finished intelligence report. It results from the collation, analysis, and evaluation of information available on a particular subject from all sources both overt and covert. (Attachment B is a list of many of the finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated by CIA during the period 1946-54.) Most finished intelligence reports are classified. Many of them include information from other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This means that classification review must be coordinated with other interested elements before the information can be downgraded or

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declassified. In some cases the titles of intelligence reports may be sensitive and require careful handling. Also, these publications receive very wide distribution throughout the U.S. government and therefore will be found in considerable numbers and in a variety of files not only in the records of intelligence and national security agencies but other U.S. government agencies as well. (U)

The processing and analysis of raw intelligence information serves to some degree to protect the source of the information. Nevertheless, the source may be identifiable through the content, subject matter, nature of the information, peculiar details, and timing. In a few cases of exceptional importance to U.S. policymakers the identify of the source may be given to aid in assessing the value of the intelligence. Information from a foreign liaison service may be distinguished through its style, content, subject matter, the conclusions drawn or comments added, and sometimes by outright identification. Intelligence methods might also be inferable, particularly where technical means are used to acquire information because of the nature, content, and quality of the data provided. Also, some sensitivity might accrue to information which concerns the handling and distribution of intelligence reporting, such as dissemination blocks, cover sheets, buck slips, and even handwritten margin notes. Such informational tidbits could indicate what information has been made available to certain organizations, thus revealing the division of effort in the intelligence community. It could reveal the names of covert personnel, identify components whose existence is classified, or reveal the existence and details of collaboration with a specific foreign liaison service. (C)

As noted above, information that CIA is responsible for may appear in documents which are not clearly discernible as CIA-originated, or in documents originated by other agencies. This makes the identification of CIA involvement very difficult. As a bottom line, we request reviewers to coordinate with CIA any information in any document bearing on, or suspected of bearing on, any of the topics discussed in this paper. Queries should be directed to the Classification Review Division, Office of Information Services, Directorate for Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505, or telephone 351-2777. (U)

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ATTACHMENT B

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All Classified SSU, CIG & CIA intelligence reports
~~ALL CIA, OSS, CIG, AND SSU DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.~~

classified intel publications
~~ALL UNIDENTIFIED~~ SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.

The following is a list of CIA finished intelligence publications that were produced and disseminated throughout the government during the period 1946-54. Copies may be found in the records holdings of any government agency that had need of, or use for, foreign intelligence. The titles of the publications often changed through the years, as did the designations of many of the CIA components which produced them. Most of these items had cover sheets with a CIA letterhead, logo, and document number. In certain cases, however, a plain cover containing only the document title was substituted, or the CIA cover sheet was removed, for security or other reasons. This listing is as complete as current institutional memory can make it but there may be other series found in government files. As experience reveals additional publications that are, or could be attributable to CIA, they should be forwarded to the Classification Review Division, Office of Information Services, Directorate for Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505.

National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) - Encyclopedic compendium of facts about a specific country, published by section, with contributions from all members of the intelligence community; e.g., USSR: Agriculture, Bolivia: Naval Forces, etc. The sections were published as completed, and some sections were updated several times before the program ended. The NIS's succeeded the JANIS reports, a similar series published during World War II by a Joint Army-Navy team.

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - Produced and coordinated during this period by the Office of National Estimates, CIA, on behalf of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) (later the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)), with contributions from all members of the intelligence community. NIE's cover long term problems or situations, and project policy analysis into the future.

Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) - originally called SE's, later called SNIE's. Originated the same way as the NIE's, except that they are spot reports covering immediate problems or crises.

Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) - Brief reports alerting the intelligence community and senior policy officials to world events of particular interest. Published daily by the Office of Current Intelligence and given wide distribution.

Current Intelligence Digest (CID) - a briefer, less formal version of the CIB.

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Current Intelligence Summary (CIS), and its codeword version, the Current Intelligence Weekly Review (CIWR) - longer, more complete documents and articles on current problem areas - published weekly. Often had one or more annexes which gave a fuller treatment to one specific problem. The annexes were sometimes published separately.

Current Support Memos and Current Support Briefs - low level monographs on economic subjects of current interest. Published periodically by the Current Support Staff of the Office of Research and Reports. Some items were codeword.


ESAU Papers, CAESAR Papers, and POLO Papers - were Staff Studies produced by the Senior Research Staff on International Communism. SRS studies were detailed, scholarly reports on various aspects of international communism; e.g., the Sino-Soviet dispute on Party doctrine. These studies were published in series, by subject matter. Sometimes they were called projects.

Studies in Intelligence - articles and book reviews of lasting interest in intelligence history, published (during this period) by the CIA, Office of Training, on a quarterly basis. Classified, but sometimes appeared with an unclassified annex attached.

Foreign Document Division (FDD) - Translations of foreign language articles from books, magazines, and periodicals of intelligence interest. These were classified to protect the method of acquisition and/or the intelligence interest. During most of this period, the Foreign Document Division was part of the CIA, Office of Operations. Hence, many FDD translations appeared as Office of Operations (OO) reports.

Consolidated Translation Survey - Longer reports by FDD which exploited numerous foreign language articles of intelligence interest for the latest information (often scientific, technical, or economic) on a single subject, e.g., Soviet electronics, Chinese Medicine, etc. These were all classified.

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